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Strategic Insights are authored monthly by analysts with the Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC). The 
CCC is the research arm of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
June 1, 2002 
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks the United States has revamped many of its foreign aid 
programs. Prior to that date the administration's top foreign aid initiatives for the 2002 fiscal year had 
been combating the spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, fighting poverty, broadening the 
public/private partnership in aid programming, and expanding the counter-narcotics campaign in the 
Andean region. These issues, while still a concern, have taken a back seat to the war on terrorism.  
Attention is now focused on devoting resources -- humanitarian, developmental and strategic -- to support 
for the campaign against terrorism. The United States has announced over one billion dollars in new aid 
to Pakistan and to assist refugees in Afghanistan and that country's neighbors. More aid is flowing to a 
broader set of nations backing the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign, especially the countries of Central Asia. 
While Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics are to be major new recipients of aid, Afghanistan will be 
by far the largest beneficiary of terrorism related assistance. Specifically, the United States and other 
Western nations have promised to essentially underwrite Afghanistan's recovery from two decades of 
drought, war and dislocation. For its part the United States has vowed to lead an international effort to 
rebuild Afghanistan on the model of the Marshall Plan for Europe after World War II. In addition U.S. 
foreign assistance is being utilized as a highly visible tool in the early days of the anti-terrorism campaign. 
The price will not be cheap. Initial studies suggested that the "going rate" for comparable nation-building 
exercises is about one billion dollars for every one million people. Including the four million Afghans living 
outside its borders, Afghanistan has a population of about 25 million. 
Current Plans and Estimates  
To date an unprecedented multilateral aid package has been assembled, with 25 donor nations 
contributing to it. Donations range from the European Union's pledge of $500 million, down to $5 million 
from Turkey. Despite these generous contributions the rough calculations above suggest much more will 
be ultimately needed. The reconstruction plan now underway, developed by the World Bank, the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), carries a base price tag 
of $14 billion, spread out over a 10 year period. This plan was sponsored by the Steering Group for the 
Reconstruction of Afghanistan, whose members include the European Union, Japan, Saudi Arabia and 
the United States.  
In order to coordinate the aid programs, both public and private, the Afghanistan Interim Administration 
presented in April 2002 a draft of its National Development Framework (NDF). All projects and programs 
of aid within Afghanistan will be expected to be anchored into the NDF. The Afghanistan Assistance 
Coordination Authority (AACA) has emphasized that government ownership of the reconstruction process 
is imperative and that a "joint partnership" between the interim authority and the aid community is 
essential. Transparency and accountability by all partners in the aid effort has been emphasized.  
In general terms, the Afghan developmental strategy includes three pillars: using humanitarian assistance 
and social policy to create the conditions for people to secure their lives and lay the foundations for the 
formation of sustainable human capital; using external assistance to build the physical infrastructure that 
will lay the basis for a private sector-led strategy of growth; and the creation of sustainable growth where 
a competitive private sector becomes both the engine of growth and the instrument of social inclusion 
through the creation of opportunity. 
Since the World Bank/UNDP/ADB reconstruction plan was released at a Tokyo summit meeting in 
January, more details have emerged regarding four main areas of concern:  
1. Governance and economic management. The estimated cost of funding government and 
economic management over the next ten years comes to $1.9 billion. Funds would be used to 
pay for day-to-day government operations, restoration of private sector development, and the 
reestablishment of a legal system. Funds would also be used to re-establish a central bank and 
finance ministry, with a regulatory framework creating a sound investment climate to support a 
revitalized private sector. The reconstruction plan also calls for a complete re-integration of 
women into the country's social fabric. One of the first areas where this will be seen is in the 
country's civil service, which had been around 43 percent female prior to the Taliban regime 
assuming power.  
2. Social protection, health and education. The planned 10 year cost of the social protection, health 
and education sections of the plan come to $2.6 billion. The reconstruction plan calls for the 
creation of a major public works program to serve the dual purpose of building the national 
infrastructure while providing social protection for women, refugees, war disabled and orphans. 
The plan also calls for a dramatic campaign to re-open schools, with an emphasis on getting 
school-age girls back to the classroom. Finally the program aims to revive and improve the 
country's public health system.  
3. Infrastructure. The 10 year cost for the infrastructure component of the plan comes to around 
$6.9 billion. The largest single expenditure envisaged in the reconstruction plan is aimed at 
rebuilding ground transport, civil aviation, water and sanitation systems, and telecommunications.  
4. Agriculture and natural resources management. Under the plan, the ten year cost for agriculture 
and natural resource management would come to around $1.4 billion. Much of this cost 
represents the restoration of war-damaged irrigation systems and the development of a natural 
resource management system.  
Many experts believe the success of the reconstruction plan depends not only on the inflow of aid dollars, 
but the speed with which the Afghan government can restore a civil society based on the rule of law. It is 
also generally felt that if the political will is there an effective national legal system can be operational 
within three years. On the other hand many experts feel the plan's 10 year cost figures will soon need to 
be revised upwards. For example, the cost of restoring the agricultural sector will also have to include 
significant financial inducements to farmers who would otherwise devote their land to opium production. 
The biggest revision will probably be needed in the telecommunications sector. The current plan allocates 
only $120 million in donor assistance, anticipating that the real capital investments needed to build a 
national grid (estimated upwards of $2 billion) would be financed by the private sector. 
The World Bank itself cites a high case 10 year cost figure of $18.1 billion. But given the additional 
infrastructure costs, unlikely to be taken up by the private sector investors, many experts now see the 
total required aid package reaching $42 billion. 
Challenges Ahead 
While the reconstruction plan sounds well thought out, there are still concerns in many circles surrounding 
the appropriate volumes of aid and relief assistance. Clearly, aid can easily be wasted if recipient 
governments do not create conducive economic and legal environments. On the other hand, relief and 
assistance aid has certainly reduced levels of child and maternal mortality, improved literacy rates, and 
accomplished other noble aims in most places where it has been attempted.  
A related concern has been expressed over Afghanistan's real capacity to absorb billions of dollars of 
reconstruction money. For example the United Nations estimates it will cost $600 million to remove most 
of the millions of landmines that litter the country. U.N. experts feel that even if the money were available 
there is simply not the means to clear these mines in a year. In fact, most experts see this as a 12 year 
program. Next year only $43 million is budgeted for mine clearing, reflecting the country's limited ability to 
implement a program of this sort.  
There are also serious economic issues raised by the prospective influx of such huge amounts of cash 
into a subsistence economy. Even absorbing the estimated $70 million the U.N. estimates is needed to 
pay civil servant back-pay and salaries for the next five months will prove difficult. The problem is how to 
manage this inflow of cash without igniting a surge in inflation. To mitigate the likely inflationary effects on 
food prices of suddenly paying 200,000 civil servants and police six months' back-pay, the U.N. is 
discussing with the interim government the possibility of issuing food coupons. But some U.N. officials 
think the government will have no choice but to print yet more Afghani notes, thus risking perhaps triple 
digit inflation.  
Hence, while it is tempting to make an analogy with the post-WWII Marshall Plan in Europe, the situations 
are clearly different. Post-war Europe already had institutions and skilled workers; what it really needed 
was vast sums of cash. Afghanistan needs money for food and health aid but it especially needs the kind 
of sustained care and security that will allow institutions to be built and Afghans trained to run them. 
Hopefully these concerns will be addressed once the initial humanitarian and relief needs are met. 
Whether donor nations will be able to meet the challenges remains to be seen. Clearly though, many 
donors feel that it is not a matter of choice. They believe that to eradicate terrorism the conditions that 
allow terrorism to take root must be eliminated. Hopefully as the Marshall Plan prevented the spread of 
Communism to Western Europe in the post-war years, the NDF despite obvious differences will be as 
effective in combating the reemergence of terrorist groups in Afghanistan and bordering countries. A note 
of caution is in order however: to date, South Korea has probably been the only case outside of Europe in 
which aid flows have both shored up an ally against a strategic threat to the United States and prompted 
the creation of a successful democratic, capitalist nation. 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our South Asia Resources. 
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